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COMMENTS 
Invoking Summary Criminal Contempt Procedures-
Use or Abuse? United States v. Dellinger*-
The "Chicago Seven" Contempts 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In late August of 1968, while delegates to the Democratic Na-
tional Convention were arriving in Chicago, a group of several thou-
sand demonstrators gathered in the city's Lincoln Park to protest the 
Convention, the Vietnam War, and the city's refusal to grant the 
group a permit to hold rallies and marches during the Convention. 
The week that followed was marred by violent confrontations be-
tween the demonstrators and the city's police.1 This violence in Chi-
cago provided the impetus for an indictment by a federal grand jury 
of the defendants in United States v. Dellinger.2 
The Dellinger case came to trial on September 24, 1969, and con-
tinued until February 14, 1970. During the trial the defendants, their 
counsel, and the presiding judge engaged in numerous heated and 
vituperative exchanges. As soon as the jury had received its instruc-
tions and had retired to deliberate, District Judge Julius J. Hoffman 
summarily cited the seven defendants3 and their two attorneys for 
various instances of criminal contempt. The court, invoking sum-
mary powers granted by Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure,4 read contempt specifications taken from the trial record 
and gave each contemnor an opportunity to address the court solely 
on the question of punishment. A separate sentence was imposed for 
each contempt specification with the terms of imprisonment to run 
consecutively.5 The contempt citations represented punishment for 
• No. 69 C.R. 180 (N.D. ID., Feb. 14-15, 1970). 
I. See, e.g., J. EPSTEIN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1970). 
2. No. 69 C.R. 180 (N.D. ru., Feb. 14-15, 1970). The grand jury returned an eight-
count indictment charging eight defendants with conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2101 
(Supp. V, 1965-1969) (inciting to riot) and 18 U.S.C. 23l(a)(l), (3) (Supp. V, 1965-1969) 
(furtherance of civil disorders). Dellinger, Davis, Hayden, Hoffman, Seale, and Rubin 
were also charged individually with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
Froines and Weiner were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 23l(a)(l) (Supp. V, 1965-
1969). 
3. The eighth defendant, Bobby Seale, was given a mistrial and sentenced to four 
years imprisonment on summary contempt charges earlier in the trial. CONTEMP'f, 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONTEMPT CITATIONS, SENTENCES, AND RESPONSES OF THE CmCAGO 
CoNSPIRACY IO, 35-36 (1970) [hereinafter CONTEMPT]. The remaining defendants were 
quickly labeled the "Chicago Seven" by the news media. 
4. Rule 42(a) provides: 
••• Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if 
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and 
that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt 
shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record. 
5. See note 55 infra. 
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alleged misconduct that had occurred over the entire course of the 
proceedings. The earliest cited instance of alleged contempt took 
place on the first day of trial, 6 with the last incident occurring five 
days before the jury retired.7 Judge Hoffman implied that the con-
tempt citations resulted from the aggregate of the contemnors' 
actions during the trial. Addressing defense attorney Leonard Wein-
glass, the judge said: "I judge your whole attitude toward the Court . 
. . . But I am obligated under the law to particularize these items of 
contempt which I have.''8 Asserting the right to notice and a hearing 
and to a jury trial before a different judge, the defense objected 
strenuously to the contempt proceedings. The questions thus raised 
present crucial and unresolved issues in the area of criminal con-
tempt. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTEMPT 
A. Common Law 
The power of courts to punish for contempt had its origin in 
canon law and was borrowed by the English chancellors as they as-
sumed equity jurisdiction.9 In the United States, the power to pun-
ish for contempt has been consistently viewed as a necessary and 
integral part of the independence of the judiciary and therefore has 
been deemed "inherent" in all courts.10 Since the contempt power 
protects courts from insult and oppression while exercising their law-
ful duties, it is considered necessary for the preservation of order in 
judicial proceedings. Moreover, this power is regarded as essential 
to the enforcement of the judgments and orders upon which the ad-
ministration of justice depends.11 
The courts have classified contempts as "civil" and "criminal." 
Civil contempt proceedings are remedial in nature and are intended 
to force compliance with a court order that has been disobeyed.12 In 
6. Weinglass (Attorney), Specification No. 1 (continuing argument when told to 
cease). CONTEMPT, supra note 3, at 213. 
7. Kunstler (Attorney), Specification No. 24. Id. at 202. 
8. Id. at 239-40. 
9. C. I.ANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURisn1cnoN 25-26 (2d ed. 1908). The 
jurisdiction of both the canon-law courts and the equity courts was limited. To 
enforce their decisions it was necessary that those tribunals be able to issue commands 
and impose punishment in case of disobedience. Id. at 26. 
10. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 505 (1873). In this case the Court stated 
"[t]he moment the courts of the United States were called into existence • • • they 
became possessed of [contempt] power." 86 (19 Wall) at 510. 
11. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911): Bessette v. 
W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 333 (1904); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 505, 
510 (1873). 
12. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74 (1957): McCrone v. United States, 
307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939). 
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a civil-contempt situation, the contemnor is imprisoned until he 
agrees to comply with the order. His action or inaction is thus de-
terminative of the length of any incarceration.13 Criminal contempt 
proceedings, on the other hand, are instituted primarily for the pur-
pose of vindicating the dignity and authority of the court.14 It con-
sists of conduct disrespectful to the court or its processes, conduct 
that obstructs the administration of justice. Because a finding of 
criminal contempt is punitive in nature-operating as punishment 
for a completed act of disrespect or disobedience-sentences for this 
type of contempt are limited to fixed periods. In many instances it 
is difficult to distinguish civil and criminal contempt. Under the fed-
eral statute,115 a single act may constitute either civil or criminal16 
contempt or both.17 The distinction is important because the type of 
contempt determines what procedural safeguards, if any, will apply 
during the contempt proceedings. For example, while criminal con-
tempt may necessitate the impaneling of a jury,18 civil contempt will 
not.19 Generally, the type of conduct, the purpose of the contempt 
proceeding, and the nature of the punishment sought determine 
whether the contempt is civil or criminal.20 
Contempts have been further categorized as "direct" or "indi-
rect." Direct contempt involves contemptuous conduct that is com-
mitted in the presence of the court or "so near thereto as to obstruct 
the administration of justice."21 Indirect contempt arises from con-
duct that, although not occurring in or near the presence of the 
court, tends to obstruct the administration of justice.22 These dis-
tinctions-civil-criminal and direct-indirect-have been codified in 
the rules and statutes that govern the exercise of the contempt power 
by the federal courts. 23 
13. Although compliance by the contemnor will ensure his release, other events may 
also secure it. For example, if he has been civilly committed for failing to answer 
questions before a grand jury, he must be released from confinement upon dismissal 
of that grand jury. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 864, 872 (1966). 
14. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448 (1911). 
15. 18 u.s.c. § 401 (1964). 
16. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451-52 (1911); Bessette 
v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 329 (1904). 
17. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 72, 74 (1957). 
18. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Chelf v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 873 
(1966). 
19. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). 
20. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448 (1911). 
21. 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1964). Although "direct" does not appear in the statute, the 
Court does recognize the term. See Nye v. United States, 813 U.S. 83 (1941). 
22, Physical distance is determinative when measuring the "nearness" of the act. 
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941), in which a contemptuous act that oc-
curred over one hundred miles from the court was held not to be direct contempt. 
23. See notes 27-33 infra and accompanying text. 
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B. Statutory Codifications 
The contempt power inherent under the common law received 
statutory recognition early in the nation's history. The original codi-
fication did little more than note the existence of the power: "[ A ]11 
the said courts of the United States shall have the power to ... pun-
ish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all con-
tempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same .... "24 
Unfortunately, the sweeping language of this provision provided no 
guidelines or boundaries for its use and it was not until after the at-
tempted impeachment of District Judge James Peck25 that the con-
tempt power was somewhat delimited.26 Current statutes place 
specific limits on the exercise of the contempt power by the federal 
courts. The bounds are basically set forth in the federal statute27 and 
in Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.28 Rule 42 is 
24. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83. 
25. Judge Peck invoked the contempt power to disbar and imprison an attorney 
who had published a criticism of one of Peck's decisions while it was pending appeal. 
The judge's action brought outcries from Congress concerning misuse of the power 
and resulted in impeachment proceedings against him. A. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE 
TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 445, 455 (1833). See also Nelles & King, Contempt by Publica-
tion in the United States, 28 COLOM. L. R.Ev. 401, 423-30 (1928). 
26. The Peck case served as the catalyst for congressional action. In 1831, the House 
of Representatives directed its Committee on the Judiciary "to inquire into the 
expediency of defining by statute all offenses which may be punished as contempts of 
the courts of the United States and also to limit the punishment for the same." 7 
CONG. DEB. 560 (1831). After the inquiry Congress adopted remedial legislation. See 
Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 488. 
27. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964) provides: 
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct 
the administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
command. 
It should be noted that a lawyer "is not the kind of 'officer' who can be summarily 
tried for contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(2)." Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 
407-08 (1956). This fact has application to the contempts issued in the "Conspiracy 
Seven" trial. Specifically, attorneys Kunstler and Weinglass would not be subject to 
subsection (2) of the act; their alleged contempts would fall within the terms of sub-
section (1 ). 
28. Rule 42. Criminal Contempt. 
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if 
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and 
that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt 
shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record. 
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as 
provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice 
shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the 
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the 
criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given 
orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on applica-
tion of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for 
that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is 
entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He 
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substantially a restatement of prior law as propounded in decisions 
of the Supreme Court.29 
Under Rule 42(a), the federal courts are allowed to punish "sum-
marily"30 direct criminal contempts committed in the actual presence 
of the court.31 In a case of summary punishment, the defendant's 
procedural rights are significantly curtailed: he is not afforded notice, 
the chance to defend himself, the assistance of counsel, the opportu-
nity to present and cross-examine witnesses, or the right to a jury 
trial.32 Rule 42(b), which requires notice and a hearing, provides 
procedural regularity for all criminal contempts other than those 
occurring in the situations envisioned by Rule 42(a). Under 42(b), 
the contemnor is afforded the panoply of procedural safeguards op-
erative in criminal proceedings and thus has, for example, the right 
to prepare a defense, to have the assistance of counsel, to call wit-
nesses, and, in appropriate cases, to have a jury trial.88 
III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT 
A. The Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury: 
A Lesson in Circuity 
Notwithstanding the constitutional guarantees of trial by jury 
for criminal offenses,84 until recently the Supreme Court had con-
sistently upheld the power of the federal courts to punish direct 
is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged 
involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from 
presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a 
verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment. 
29. NOTES OF ADVISORY CO~[M. ON RULES, FED. R. CluM. P. 42(a), in Appendix, 18 
U.S.C. (1964), at 3766. 
30. Summary proceedings differ procedurally from traditional criminal convictions. 
The Supreme Court has stated that " 'summary' • • • refers to a procedure which 
dispenses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from •.• all that 
goes with a conventional court trial." Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952). 
Indeed, all the judge need do is inform the contemnors of the charges against them 
and specify the sentences for each charge. The contemnors have no right to participate 
in the proceedings. 343 U.S. at 9. 
31. FED. R. CRIM, P. 42(a). For a discussion of limitations on the power of a court 
to invoke summary proceedings, see notes 90-135 infra and accompanying text. 
32. The procedural anomalies in summary proceedings result from reliance on 
the theory that the court sees the contemptuous conduct in all its nuances and can 
act on its own knowledge of the facts. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 
(1925). This theory assumes that the court will be able to evaluate and act upon the 
facts in an objective manner, an assumption that is open to serious question. 
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b), set out in note 28 supra. 
34. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2 provides that "[t]he trial of all crimes, except in cases 
of impeachment, shall be by jury •••• " U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides in part that 
"the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. 
" 
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criminal contempt summarily.35 Wary of impairing the ability of 
judges to preserve order and decorum during the course of a trial, 
the Court was hesitant to impose potentially cumbersome procedural 
safeguards on contempt proceedings. Instead, judges were urged to 
exercise the utmost self-restraint in utilizing their summary contempt 
powers36 and were additionally instructed to consider "the extent of 
the willful and deliberate defiance of the court's order [and] the 
seriousness of the consequences of the contumacious behavior" before 
imposing sentence.37 Although these nonconstitutional restraints still 
exist, the despotic potential of the contempt power has led the Court 
to impose additional restrictions of a constitutional nature.88 Thus, 
in Che-ff v. Schnackenberg,39 the Court held that criminal contempt 
convictions in the federal courts involving a sentence of six months 
or less do not require a jury trial because they are "petty" offenses40 
excluded from the protection of the sixth amendment.41 In an em-
phatic dictum, the Court went on to direct that all future sentences 
for criminal contempt exceeding six months require trial by jury.42 
35. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692-700 (1964) (defendants 
not entitled to a jury trial for serious contempts); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 
183 (1958) (no constitutional right to jury trial for criminal contempt). 
36. See, e.g., In Te McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 233 (1962); Green v. United States, !156 
U.S. 162, 188 (1958). 
37. United States v. UMW, !130 U.S. 258, !103 (1947). See also In Te Bradley, lHS 
U.S. 50, 52 (1943) (fine and imprisonment mutually exclusive alternatives). 
38. The Court bad already imposed upon contempt proceedings some basic 
procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954) (right to 
an unbiased judge); In Te Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-72 (1948) (right to a public trial); 
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (protection against self-incrimina-
tion). 
39. 384 U.S. 373 (1966). Petitioner was charged with criminal contempt for aiding 
and abetting a company to violate a pendente lite compliance order, issued by a court 
at the instance of the Federal Trade Commission. 
40. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937), in which the 
Court noted that 
[i]t is settled by the decisions of this Court ••• that the right of trial by jury •• , 
does not extend to every criminal proceeding. At the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution there were numerous offenses, commonly described as "petty," 
which were tried summarily without a jury • • • • 
41. 384 U.S. at !179-80. 
42. 384 U.S. at 380. The Court's dictum presents a serious problem when applied to 
criminal contempt because the federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 401, set out in note 27 supra) 
does not establish a maximum penalty for contempt. Although the maximum penalty 
authorized by statute would normally be determinative of the classification of an 
offense as either petty or serious (see notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text), the 
actual penalty imposed must be used if contempt is the crime under consideration. 
Since the sentence to be imposed is unknown until after the summary contempt pro• 
ceeding has been completed, it would appear that a two-step process may be necessary 
if the "six-month" rule is to be applied to criminal contempt. Initially, the trial 
judge would have to decide what sentence would be appropriate and, if the possible 
sentence exceeded six months, a jury would have to be empaneled to bear the case on 
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Subsequently, in Bloom v. Illinois,43 the Court explicitly held that 
the sixth amendment requires a jury trial in both federal and state 
situations involving "serious" criminal contempt.44 Both potential 
and real abuses of the contempt power served as justification for the 
new rule.45 Indeed, the Court noted that the potential for judicial 
abuse was greater in the area of contempt than in any other type of 
criminal proceeding because contempt often strikes at the human 
qualities of the judge and usually signals a rejection of his judicial 
authority.46 Presumably it was this potentially prejudicial aspect of 
the offense that led the Court to erect the jury as a buffer between the 
contemnor and the court, at least in all cases of "serious" criminal 
contempt.47 Recently, in Baldwin v. New York,48 the Court reaf-
firmed the use of the jury as a buffer in serious criminal cases: 
[T]he primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the possibility of op-
pression by the Government; the jury interposes between the accused 
and his accuser the judgment of laymen who are less tutored perhaps 
than a judge ... , but who at the same time are less likely to func-
tion or appear as but another arm of the Government that has pro-
ceeded against him.49 
Although Baldwin did not deal specifically with contempt, its con-
cern with the possibility of oppression may be of even greater sig-
nificance in the area of criminal contempt in which the judge himself 
acts as prosecutor. 
the merits. There is, of course an incongruity in this process since the trial judge 
would have to consider the merits at the outset in order to decide what would be an 
appropriate sentence. In the wake of Chefj the alert judge would simply limit his con-
tempt sentences to six months and perhaps string together several sentences of six 
months in an attempt to avoid the jury trial requirement. 
43. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Defendant was charged with contempt for willfully peti-
tioning to admit to probate a falsely prepared will. His demand for a jury trial on 
the contempt charge was refused and he was sentenced to two years imprisonment by 
an Illinois state court. 391 U.S. at 210. 
44. [S]erious contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are sub-
ject to the jury trial provision of the Constitution, now binding on the States, 
and that the traditional rule is constitutionally infirm insofar as it permits 
other than petty contempts to be tried wihout honoring a demand for a jury 
trial. 
391 U.S. at 198. 
45. See 391 U.S. at 202-08. 
46. 391 U.S. at 202 n.2. 
47. In recognizing this need for an intervening jury, the Court specifically rejected 
its prior holding in the case of In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895), that "[t]o submit 
the question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would 
operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.'' 391 U.S. at 208. 
48. 399 U.S. 66 (1970). The defendant had been charged with the misdemeanor of 
"jostling," which carried a maximum sentence of one year. The denial of his motion 
for a jury trial was reversed by the Court as a violation of the sixth and fourteenth 
amendments. 399 U.S. at 69, 73-74. 
49. 899 U.S. at 72. 
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The first question to be answered in light of Chef! and Bloom is 
whether those decisions apply to the Dellinger situation since, on 
their facts, they relate only to indirect criminal contempt.1'° I£ these 
decisions are applicable only to indirect contempt, there is little 
reason for concern with the jury trial issue since even "serious" di-
rect contempt could be tried without a jury. An argument that 
Chef! and Bloom should not be applied to cases of direct contempt 
can be made. Direct contempt summarily adjudged has normally 
produced sentences consisting of only a fine or a few days imprison-
ment51 whereas the imposition of increasingly severe punishments, 
which prompted the Supreme Court's restrictive decisions in Chef] 
and Bloom, has been primarily confined to cases of indirect con-
tempt. 52 The Court's apparent concern, therefore, was with abuses 
in the punishment of misbehavior that occurs beyond the purview 
of the judge and not with the handling of direct contempt that oc-
curs in the judge's presence. Thus, proponents of a· strong contempt 
power might well argue that the restrictions of Chef! and Bloom ap-
ply only to those cases involving indirect contempt. However, in 
Bloom, the Court precluded any such narrow interpretation; after 
announcing the application of the sixth amendment to cases of seri-
ous contempt, it went on to consider specifically the jury trial right 
in regard to the exercise of the summary (i.e., direct) contempt power. 
Although noting the unique circumstances surrounding direct con-
tempt and the attendant need for immediate action, the Court never-
theless found no reason to except serious direct-contempt proceedings 
from the right to a jury trial.53 Hence, if the Dellinger offenses con-
50. The facts in Cheff and Bloom are discussed in notes 39 & 43 supra. The direct-
indirect contempt distinction is discussed in text accompanying notes 21-22 supra. 
51. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1965) (10 days imprisonment 
and $250 fine); United States v. Bradt, 294 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1961) ($100 fine); Cammer 
v. United States, 223 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1955), revd., 350 U.S. 399 (1956) ($100 fine); 
Offutt v. United States, 208 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1953), revd., 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (10 days 
imprisonment). See generally Comment, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Sug-
gestion That Due Process Requires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent 
Tribunal, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463 (1966). 
52. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 167 (1958) (three years imprison• 
ment for failure to return from bail after a court had ordered return); Nilva v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 385, 386 (1957) (one year and one day imprisonment for disobeying a 
subpoena duces tecum); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 269 (1947) (union fined 
$3,500,000 and its president fined $10,000 for disobeying a restraining order). See also 
Comment, Constitutional Law-Right to Jury Trial in Indirect Criminal Contempts 
in Federal Courts, 57 MICH. L. REv. 258, 264-66 (1958). 
53. Although Rule 42(a) is based in part on the premise that it is not necessary 
specially to present the facts of a contempt which occurred in the very presence 
of the judge, it also rests on the need to maintain order and a deliberative at-
mosphere in the courtroom. The power of a judge to quell disturbance cannot 
attend [sic] upon the impaneling of a jury. There is, therefore, a strong tempta-
tion to make exception to the rule we establish today for disorders in the court-
room. We are convinced, however, that no such special rule is needed. 
391 U.S. at 209-10. 
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stitute serious direct contempts, the six-month rule is clearly appli-
cable.114 
Although the Court has established the six-month line as the ma-
jor characteristic of a "serious" offense and has employed that con-
cept in making clear the applicability of the jury trial right to cases 
of both direct and indirect contempt, it has not considered the ques-
tion whether by charging a contemnor with a multiplicity of sep-
arate offenses and attaching a separate sentence of less than six 
months to each, a court may impose a total sentence exceeding six 
months without affording the protection of a jury trial. It was 
through the use of such a technique that the district court in Del-
linger was able to mete out aggregate sentences that exceeded, on 
the average, twenty months in duration,55 without expressly defying 
the underlying principles of Chef!, Bloom, and Baldwin. Conse-
quently, the major issue presented by Dellinger is whether the ap-
plicability of the constitutional requirement of a jury trial for 
sentences exceeding six months is to be determined on the basis of 
the individual sentence for each of the various incidents of contempt 
or on the basis of the aggregate penalty for all the incidents of con-
tempt. I£ the former is found to be the case, it would seem that the 
heart of the substantive six-month rule may be circumvented in any 
situation involving more than one alleged contempt by the same in-
dividual. 
Even during the era of nonconstitutional constraints on the con-
tempt power, the Supreme Court, in an effort to prevent judicial 
arbitrariness, required that each contemptuous act occurring during 
any proceeding be specified on the record thereof with the corre-
sponding portion of the total punishment specifically set forth. 56 
54. [W]hen serious punishment for contempt is contemplated, rejecting a de-
mand for jury trial cannot be squared with the Constitution or justified by con-
siderations of efficiency or the desirability of vindicating the authority of the 
court. 
391 U.S. at 208. 
55. The contempt sentences imposed were: 
Defendant Charges Sentence 
Dellinger 32 specifications 2 years, 5 months, 16 days 
Davis 23 specifications 2 years, 1 month, 14 days 
Hayden 11 specifications 1 year, 2 months, 14 days 
Hoffman 24 specifications 8 months 
Rubin 16 specifications 2 years, 1 month, 23 days 
Weiner 7 specifications 2 months, 18 days 
Froines IO specifications 5 months, 15 days 
Weinglass (Attorney) 14 specifications I year, 8 months, 28 days 
Kunstler (Attorney) 24 specifications 4 years, 13 days 
THE TALES OF HOFFMAN 287-89 (M. Levine, G. McNamee &: D. Greenberg ed. 1970) 
[hereinafter 'I ALES]. 
56. Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 440 (1911). It should be 
noted that Gompers required specification of indirect criminal contempt. Dellinger, 
on the other hand, involves direct contempt. However, the specificity requirement 
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More important, the Court has held that in certain situations re-
petitive actions, such as persistent refusals by a witness to answer the 
same or similar questions, are to be adjudged a continuing contempt 
and that, consequently, only one offense may be charged.57 Since this 
"continuing contempt" limitation purports to restrict the compound-
ing of sentences for the same type of continual misbehavior, it can 
be argued that the incidents cited in the Dellinger contempt specifi-
cations should be considered as single continuing contempts by each 
defendant. For several reasons the continuing contempt concept 
seems applicable to the Dellinger case. First, the contemptuous con-
duct set out in the Dellinger specifications was chosen from a record 
replete with continuous misbehavior: the defendants' antics repre-
sent a formidable portion of the 22,000 page trial transcript.58 Second, 
the trial judge conceded that the defendants were being punished 
for their participation in a single plan to disrupt the trial rather 
than for the isolated incidents specified. Thus, at one point, Judge 
Hoffman said "[I]t has been my considered judgment throughout 
this case that the behavior of the defendants was aimed at baiting 
the judge and inciting and harassing the U.S. Attorneys in an attempt 
to stop the trial."li9 
The vagueness of the authorizing statute relied on by the court in 
Dellinger lends further support to the use of the continuing contempt 
or single-offense theory. In its pertinent part the statute provides only 
that a court may punish "[m]isbehavior of any person in its presence 
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."60 In 
passing this statute, Congress failed to fix the offense in an unam-
biguous fashion. The Court has said of construing such statutes that 
"doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into 
multiple offenses ... .''61 The application of this continuing offense 
would appear to be equally applicable to direct criminal contempt since the Court in 
Gompers was concerned only with the distinction between civil and criminal contempts 
and applied the specification procedure to the latter contempts as a class. 221 U.S. at 
441. 
57. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1957). See also United States v. Orman, 
207 F.2d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952). 
58. Judge Hoffman himself said, before sentencing defendants for their alleged 
contempts, "some of the offenders have engaged in such impudent repetition of their 
misconduct, that the court finds the imposition of consecutive sentences necessary." 
CONTEMPT, TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONTEMPT CITATIONS, SENTENCES, AND REsPONSES OF THE 
CHICAGO CONSPIRACY 10, 42 (1970) [hereinafter CONTEMPT]. 
59. Id. at 43-44. 
60. 18 u.s.c. § 401(1) (1964). 
61. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955). Bell involved a prosecution under 
the Mann Act wherein the defendant was charged with a &eparate violation for each 
of two women he transport!!d across state lines. The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that there was but a single violation. 349 U.S. at 84. The "single transaction" test of 
Bell is not the only test established by the Court. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 
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concept would allow the imposition of only one sentence per con-
temnor, which, in turn, would be subject to the six-month limitation 
on the use of summary punishment. 
In deciding whether the actions in Dellinger constitute separate 
offenses or a single contempt, reference must again be made to the 
language of the authorizing statute.62 It should be noted that the 
other contempt provisions embodied in the federal code contain fixed 
maximum penalties;63 the statute in question, however, leaves the 
choice of penalty completely to the discretion of the trial court. This 
lack of any statutory maximum for judicially imposed contempt 
sentences may indicate an intention on the part of Congress to allow 
a substantial degree of judicial discretion with respect to contempt 
by authorizing trial court judges to select not only the sentence of 
their choice but the basis for prosecution as well-that is, by giving 
them the power to determine exactly what actions will constitute 
separate offenses. The history of section 401 belies this argument, 
however. The federal contempt statutes were not enacted to provide 
the courts with a new tool for dealing with courtroom disturbances.64 
The contempt power existed long before 1789 when the first con-
tempt legislation was passed by Congress.65 Instead the statutory re-
finements have purported to restrict and define the courts' contempt 
power, not to enhance it.66 Any interpretation granting such unre-
stricted power to a judge contravenes the spirit of the legislation. In 
view of the restrictive intent of the original contempt statute, it does 
U.S. 29!1, !104 (19!!2), the Court announced: "[I']he test to be applied to determine 
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each [charge] requires proof 
of fact [sic] which the other does not." Since each contempt specification is a separate 
incident susceptible to proof by different facts, it could be argued that the "same 
evidence" test under Blockburger is met. However, in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 
(1970) (the fifth amendment's protection against double jeopardy embodies the col-
lateral estoppcl principle), Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall expressly rejected 
use of the "same evidence" rule in their concurring opinion. Instead, they offered a 
"same transaction" test as a substitute. !!97 U.S. 448, 451-52. Argument by analogy here 
would be tenuous since Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall were not speaking 
for a majority of the Court. Indeed, it could be argued that the test is inappropriate 
for a unique offense such as contempt. While Bloom has seemingly disposed of this 
proposition by proclaiming contempt to be a crime like any other crime, the distin-
tion receives some support from the lack of any time-space relation in the setting of 
continuing misbehavior. "While a man can murder six men at virtually the same time, 
the contumacious acts may be spread over a period of several months as in Dellinger. 
On this basis the analogy might prove unsound. 
62. 18 U.S.C. § 401, set out in note 27 supra. 
63. Contempts committed in military courts are statutorily restricted. Article 28 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 848 (1964) prescribes a punishment 
not to exceed confinement for 30 days or a fine of $100, or both. 22 U.S.C. § 703(c) 
(1964), concerning service courts of friendly foreign forces, limits punishment to a fine 
of $2,000 or 6 months imprisonment, or both. 
64. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text. 
65. See note 24 supra. 
66. See generally Recent Decision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REY. 114 (1962). 
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not seem amiss in doubtful cases to construe its provisions in favor 
of .finding a single continuing offense rather than a string of multiple 
offenses. Such a reading of the statute would, of course, allow the 
imposition of only one sentence, which then would be subject to the 
six-month limitation on summary proceeding-s. 
Should the attempt to characterize the contempts in Dellinger as 
single continuing offenses prove unavailing, there remains the serious 
concern that, by simply dividing the offense into numerous compo-
nents, potentially in.finite sentences could be meted out summarily 
by a trial judge under Rule 42(a) without the defendant receiving the 
protection of any procedural safeguards. 67 Thus, one of the basic 
issues posed by Dellinger is whether any of the contemnors are en-
titled to a jury trial under Chef! and Bloom. If the total punishment 
that Judge Hoffman could have summarily imposed must fall 
within the six-month limitation for serious criminal contempt, all 
but two of the contemnors should be accorded a jury trial.68 The crux 
of the problem is that no statute or court decision expressly denies a 
trial court the power to aggregate sentences that individually do not 
exceed the six-month line drawn by Bloom and Chef!. The deficiency 
inherent in any such proposition, however, lies in its practical applica-
tion, for it is only when the aggregate sentence is considered deter-
minative that any realistic limits are imposed by Bloom and Chef!. 
If trial judges are left free to dispense six-month sentences for each 
count of contempt, any judge could, simply by searching the record 
for any colorable instances of contempt and imposing the maximum 
sentence for each one, send a contemnor to jail for an almost in.finite 
period of time. Thus, if the six-month rule is applicable only to each 
offense, it does not curtail potential abuse of the contempt power. It 
was, after all, the Supreme Court's recognition of the potential abuse 
inherent in the contempt power that led it in Bloom to impose the 
six-month maximum for non jury proceeding-s. If harshness and abuse 
in the form of lengthy contempt sanctions are tolerated under the 
guise that they represent punishment for separate offenses, the entire 
purpose of the constitutional limitations imposed by Bloom, Chef!, 
and Baldwin is frustrated.69 If the Court is genuinely concerned about 
67. There are at least three potential restraints on the use of summary contempt 
under Rule 42(a). First, while punishment generally lies within the sound discretion 
of the court, it may be disturbed if clearly abused. Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 
396 (1957). Second, the punishment cannot be cruel and unusual. Green v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 165, 187-88 (1958); United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 
136, 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 734 (1944). A final potential limitation is the 
rule that a penal sanction exceeding six months in duration may not be imposed absent 
a jury trial. See notes 39-54 supra and accompanying text. 
68. Only defendants Froines (5 months, 15 days) and Weiner (2 months, 18 days) 
were given less than six-month sentences. See note 55 supra. 
69. A decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Langes, 
434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mayberry v. Penn• 
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potential abuse of the contempt power, it would appear self-defeating 
to affirm Judge Hoffman's actions in Dellinger. 
In determining whether the six-month limit applies to aggregate 
sentencing, analogy to other areas of constitutional law and criminal 
procedure might prove fruitful. In regard to the constitutional right 
to counsel, for example, the aggregate punishments authorized by stat-
ute determine whether the guarantee is applicable.70 The aggregate 
sentence is also often determinative when a defendant seeks a court 
appeal.71 Since these procedural rights are based upon the aggregate 
punishment levied, it seems logical to extend the constitutional right 
to a jury trial in contempt proceedings on the similar basis of the 
aggregate sentence imposed. Even given this view, however, it could 
be argued that since Judge Hoffman could have summarily punished 
the contemnors immediately after each outbreak, he should be 
allowed to cumulate the individual offenses for dispensation upon 
termination of the trial. Indeed, the summary contempt power under 
Rule 42(a) has sometimes been invoked after completion of the trial, 
the justification being that the trial judge should not be precluded 
from utilizing a power he possessed during the trial just because he 
awaited the conclusion of the trial to invoke it.72 The Supreme Court, 
in Sacher v. United States,73 concluded that no possible prejudice 
could result in that case from the delayed use of summary contempt, 
since the conduct of the contemnor had warranted immediate punish-
ment on "dozens of occasions."74 This reasoning, however, has come 
under attack by critics and has been disregarded in more recent Court 
decisions.75 
It would appear that theories are available that would both allow 
or deny the imposition of multiple contempt sentences in excess of 
six months by a judge acting without a jury. Because of the argu-
mentative circuity involved, attempts to resolve the problem of the 
application of Bloom and Chef! to multiple consecutive contempt 
sylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), serves to illustrate the potential ramifications of cumu-
lating prison sentences in summary contempt proceedings. Mayberry, a convict, was 
summarily sentenced for contempt under Pennsylvania law for a term of eleven to 
twenty-two years imprisonment on eleven separate one- to two-year sentences. For 
further discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 132-35 infra. 
70. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1969) ("If a guilty person is con-
victed, the sum of the potential [actual] penalties is what is important to him-and 
to society.'). See also Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 
(1969); Bohr v. Purdy, 412 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969); Steadman v. Duff, 302 F. Supp. 313 
(1969). 
71. See Chambers v. District of Columbia, 194 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1952); O'Bryant 
v. District of Columbia, 223 A.2d 799 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1966). 
72. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). 
73. 343 U.S. 1 (1952). 
74. 343 U.S. at 10. 
75. See notes 108-13 infra and accompanying text. 
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sentences solely in terms of the length of imprisonment may prove 
fruitless. Because the length of the prison term is so intertwined with 
the issue of defendants' rights to a jury trial, it might be better to 
approach the problem by seeking alternative means of measuring the 
seriousness of the contempt. Given that the contempt must be 
"serious" if defendants are to qualify for a jury trial, the problem 
could be viewed as one of measuring the gravity of their offenses in 
terms of the traditional factors normally relied upon for determining 
the seriousness of other crimes.76 The "nature of the offense" and its 
"stigma" represent types of alternative factors that might be taken 
into consideration.77 Illustratively, the mere existence of multiple, as 
opposed to single, contempt may be considered as an indication of a 
more serious offense. Further, the stigma which attaches to conviction 
and four years imprisonment, and which may cause irreparable 
damage to a defendant's reputation, is surely indicative of a "serious" 
offense. On the other hand, the character of contempt is such that it is 
rarely considered a "hard-core" crime like murder or rape. 
There is some evidence that the Supreme Court might be recep-
tive to analyzing the seriousness of the contempts in terms of factors 
other than the length of the sentence. At least in the case of ordinary 
offenses, the Court has said that punishment is but one indication of 
the seriousness of a crime.78 Since contempts are indistinguishable 
from ordinary crimes,79 it would appear reasonable to apply this 
"alternative-factor" analysis. However, the Court has been reluctant 
to move in this direction. In Frank v. United States,80 defendant was 
charged with indirect criminal contempt for violation of an order of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. After being denied a jury 
trial, he was convicted and sentenced to three years' probation. The 
case appeared ripe for the use of the alternative-factor analysis by the 
Supreme Court since the statutory definition of a "petty offense" 
speaks exclusively in terms of penal sanctions and monetary fines81 
76. Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the majority's opinion in Chelf. They 
felt that any determination of seriousness required a sophisticated analysis of the 
nature of the offense, not just the punishment. Factors to be considered, they felt, 
should include (but would not be limited to) the stigma, character (malum in se or 
malum prohibitum), and gravity of the offense. Furthermore, they argued, the right to 
trial by jury should be expanded to encompass all crimes, petty and serious. 384 U.S. at 
387-90. 
77. Frankfurter &: Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty 
of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REY. 917, 980-81 (1926), 
78. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) ("crimes carrying possible penal-
ties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty 
offenses"). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (reckless driving 
offenses held to require a jury trial because they were malum in se). 
79. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968). 
80. 395 U.S. 147 (1969). 
81. "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for :, 
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without any mention of how to deal with a probationary penalty. The 
Court refused, however, to consider any factors other than the actual 
length of the penalty imposed82 and, since probation for up to five 
years is appropriate for both petty and serious offenses,88 the three-
year probationary period fell, at least definitionally, within the con-
fines of the petty offense statute. While this decision may be limited 
to probation cases, if read broadly it would imply that the Court is 
unwilling to look beyond the length of sentence imposed in determin-
ing the seriousness of the contempt. Frank may thus signal a judicial 
intention to adhere strictly to the letter of Bloom and Gheff. The 
duration of the sentence may be the only factor that the Court is 
willing to consider, and while it may be appealing to argue alterna-
tive factors, the Court may be less than willing to listen. 
The question whether the contemnors should be afforded a jury 
trial is thus a circuitous one. I£ the sentence exceeds six months in 
duration, a jury trial is required. Yet it is unclear whether the six-
month limit applies to each separate sentence or to the aggregate 
term of imprisonment. Support can be found for either proposition. 
Finally, it appears doubtful that the courts will look beyond the 
length of sentence to determine the "seriousness" of the crime. Faced 
with the difficult problem of interpreting "seriousness," the courts 
may well look to one of the other issues raised by Dellinger in order 
to prevent abuses of the contempt power. 
B. Summary Proceedings vs. Notice and Hearing 
Citation for direct contempt should not be delayed for months. 
It should spring fresh from the alleged obstruction of the court's per-
formance of its judicial duty, although adjudication and punishment 
might well await the convenience of the court's business.84 
Rule 42 provides two methods for dealing with contempt: sum-
mary disposition and disposition upon notice and hearing.85 Of the 
various categories of contempt, only certain direct contempts are 
subject to summary disposition under Rule 42(a).86 Beyond this 
narrowly defined class of misbehavior, contempt may be adjudged 
only after notice and hearing under Rule 42(b). In discussing the two 
types of contempt, the Court has said: "Rule 42(b) prescribes the 
'procedural regularity' for all contempts in the federal regime except 
period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty offense." 
18 u.s.c. § 1(3) (1964). 
82. 395 U.S. at 149. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691-92 (1964), which specifically 
provide for jury trials. 
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964). 
84. Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir, 1961). 
85. FED, R. CRIM. P. 42, set out in note 28 supra. 
86. See R. GoLDFARB, THE CoNTEMPT Powm 48 (1963). 
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those unusual situations envisioned by Rule 42(a) where instant 
action is necessary to protect the judicial institution itself."87 
The justification for summary action in cases of direct contempt is 
twofold. First, because the misbehavior occurs before the judge, he is 
able to observe the contempt in all its nuances. Thus, if the trial court 
can remain objective, no further facts need be introduced to prove or 
disprove the defendant's guilt. Second, the power to summarily 
punish contempt is often justified as necessary to the preservation of 
order in the courtroom or of "the judicial institution itself." Con-
sistent with the logic of this second justification, summary punish-
ment of contempt is authorized only when the exigencies of the trial 
require immediate action. 88 This restriction is an outgrowth of the 
general belief that judicial action should be limited to the least pos-
sible power adequate to the end proposed."89 
Notwithstanding such justifications, the summary contempt 
power has evoked criticism from legal scholars,90 many of whom feel 
that the need for procedural safeguards outweighs the justifications 
offered in support of the power. Concern has focused on the seem-
ingly anomalous position held by the summary contempt power in a 
judicial system predicated on due process of law. Undoubtedly be-
cause of these concerns, the Supreme Court has attempted to restrict 
the situations in which the power may be invoked. Thus, in a case 
decided over two decades ago, the Court recognized that a judge sit-
ting as a one-man grand jury was not qualified to sit in judgment on 
the contempt charges he had levied against witnesses appearing 
before him.91 However, this relaxation of what previously had 
amounted to a strict and zealous protection of judicial authority was 
partially nullified by dictum to the effect that any "demoralization" of 
judicial authority would not be tolerated and summary action would 
87. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965). See also United States v. Pace, 
371 F.2d 810, 811 (2d Cir. 1967). 
88. "[Summary] punishment was so contrary to ••• due process, that the assump-
tion that the court saw everything that went on in open court was required to justify 
the exception [for summary contempt]; but the need for immediate penal vindication 
of the dignity of the court created it." Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925). 
See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919); Ex 
parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). 
89. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821). 
90. Frankfurter &: Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Con-
tempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A. Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 1010, 1024-26 (1924); Note, Supreme Court Narrows Scope of Summary Procedures 
in Federal Contempt Convictions, 1966 DuKE L.J. 814; Recent Cases, 36 MINN. 
L. R.Ev. 965 (1952); Recent Cases, 99 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 540 (1951). 
91. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). While the Court specifically alluded to the 
need for a public trial when one man fulfills the roles of prosecutor, plaintiff, judge, 
and jury, there was equal concern for the defendant's right to defend himself against 
the charge, especially since there was no apparent need for instantaneous punishment. 
333 U.S. at 273. 
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be sanctioned in such circumstances.92 In yet another case, the Court 
noted that contempts could be disposed of only after notice and a 
hearing 
[u]nless [the action presents] such an open threat to the orderly pro-
cedure of the court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and 
presence of the judge before the public in the "very hallowed place 
of justice", ... [that if it] is not instantly suppressed and punished, 
demoralization of the court's authority will follow.93 
At the outset then, the Supreme Court's concern with the degree 
of disrespect shown the lower courts lends some support to Judge 
Hoffman's choice of summary contempt in Dellinger since the de-
fendants' purported goal was to defy and ridicule the entire system 
of justice.04 However, since it appears that "immediacy" is at least 
generally required before summary disposition can be had under 
Rule 42(a), the contempt sentences in Dellinger appear to be ques-
tionable in light of the fact that the summary proceedings took place 
after the trial was over. Yet, in Sacher v. United States,95 the Court 
ignored the "immediacy" requirement for summary contempt and 
specifically sanctioned the use of summary procedure in a trial in 
which direct contempts were involved. After the jury had returned a 
verdict in Sacher, the contemnors96 were summarily punished for 
their courtroom behavior. In interpreting Rule 42 for the first time 
and citing two lower-court decisions in which contempt proceedings 
had been deferred until after trial,97 the Court affirmed the contempt 
charges. However, the Court's reliance on these two lower court 
decisions may have been unfortunate since the cases involved only 
short overnight delays08 between the actual misbehavior and the 
contempt proceedings, whereas the Sacher tontempt proceedings had 
been delayed for nine months, a period covering the entire trial. Al-
though this time distinction was obvious, the Court concluded that 
92. 333 U.S. at 257, quoting from Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925). 
93. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925). 
9-!. See TIME, Feb. 23, 1970, at 38-39; NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1970, at 26, cols. 1-2. 
95. 343 U.S. 1 (1952). 
96. The contemnors were defense attorneys involved in a criminal trial. The con-
tempts stemmed from their actions in the district court in the case of United States 
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), afjd., 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
97. The Court cited Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. 
denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951), in which the court affirmed a lower court's summary con-
tempt proceeding which had been delayed overnight before judgment was pro-
nounced; and Maclnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 
U.S. 953 (1952), in which the court affirmed a summary contempt proceeding in-
volving an overnight delay before the contemnor was notified that a certificate of 
contempt would be filed. 343 U.S. at 7. 
98. See note 97 supra. See also United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 338 U.S. 851 (1949), in which the contempt citation occurred the same day as 
the disruptions, but formal judgment was deferred for five days. 
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"summary" does not refer to the timing of the contempt action but 
merely does away with the "formalities" of notice and hearing.99 
Specifically, the delay was deemed to fall within the trial court's 
discretion as long as the defendants were not prejudiced by it, and, 
since any contempt proceedings during the trial might have prej-
udiced the defendants either in the eyes of the jury or by loss of 
counsel, the Supreme Court found no abuse of ·discretion in the 
lower court's decision to await the trial's conclusion before taking 
affirmative action.100 However, in Dellinger the prejudice problem is 
less compelling because many of the specified contempts took place 
while the jury was out of the courtroom.101 Had the defendants been 
cited for contempt during the jury's absence there could have been 
no prejudice, since the jury was sequestered during the entire trial. 
Moreover, when the contemptuous acts did take place in the jury's 
presence, prejudice might have been avoided by sending the jury 
from the courtroom and immediately citing the defendants while de-
ferring adjudication and punishment until after the trial. 
In Sacher, the Court also voiced concern over the delay that 
might be caused by interjecting a contempt proceeding into the 
middle of a trial. Such potential delay, it was argued, could be best 
avoided by awaiting the trial's conclusion and then proceeding 
against the contemnors summarily.102 There are at least two objec-
tions to the Court's reasoning. First, delay could be avoided by 
proceeding in the two-step fashion discussed above, that is, by 
immediate citation with adjudication and punishment deferred until 
after the conclusion of the trial. Second, if delay is only a problem 
during and not after the trial, there is no reason for not holding a full 
hearing on the contempt question after the trial. Indeed, if summary 
action is the exception rather than the rule and is justified only when 
delay must be avoided, it has no purpose when the need for im-
mediate action has passed. If the summary power is justified by its 
service to the judge in his attempts to quell disturbances that obstruct 
or delay the trial, that justification ceases to suffice when the trial has 
ended. 
The proposition that only an acute need for an immediate sanc-
tion allows the use of the summary powers found in Rule 42(a) is 
supported by Justice Holmes' statement: 
I would go as far as any man in favor of the sharpest and most sum-
mary enforcement of order in Court and obedience to decrees, but 
99. 343 U.S. at 9. 
100. 343 U.S. at 8-10. 
101. For example, many of the contempt charges against attorney Weinglass were 
the result of lengthy legal argument. These arguments often occurred after the jury 
had been excused. See CONTEMPT, supra note 58, at 213-34. 
102. 343 U.S. at 10. 
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when there is no need for immediate action contempts are like any 
other breach of law and should be dealt with as the law deals with 
other illegal acts.103 
Justice Black, in his dissent in Sacher, echoed this thought: "There 
was no necessity here for ... summary action, because the trial was 
over and the danger of obstructing it was passed."104 Seemingly then 
neither Holmes nor Black would condone the proceedings in Del-
linger since the contempt sentences were dispensed in summary 
fashion after the trial had ended. However, Judge Hofftnan may well 
have believed that the interjection of 16!1°5 citations for contempt 
during the trial would have resulted in constant disruption, thereby 
defeating the very end that the summary contempt power was 
created to further. It might additionally be posited that if the judge's 
actions were restricted in such fashion that it was impossible for him 
to exercise his authorized power during the trial, he at least should 
be able to use the power after the trial. Indeed, if the reason for delay 
in dealing with the alleged contempts was solely to prevent any preju-
dice from tainting the defendants' trial, why should they thus be 
allowed to escape summary punishment that could have been ad-
ministered but for solicitude for their right to a fair trial? As the 
Court in Sacher stated: 
H the conduct of these lawyers warranted immediate summary pun-
ishment on dozens of occasions, no possible prejudice to them can re-
sult from delaying it until the end of the trial if the circumstances 
permit such delay. The overriding consideration is the integrity and 
efficiency of the trial process .... 100 
Perhaps the only reply necessary to the position taken in Sacher 
is to remark that it appears somewhat anomalous that the Court 
should, in effect, consider the power of summary contempt superior 
to those procedural safeguards so vital to anyone charged with crimi-
nal misconduct. Further, the Court in Sacher failed to deal with the 
aspect of the practical deterrent effect on future courtroom mis-
behavior that immediate citation for contempt might have pro-
vided. If one of the fundamental premises underlying punishment 
of criminal behavior is the belief that a sanction will serve to deter 
similar conduct in the future, the use of the summary contempt 
power after a trial has ended forecloses any deterrent effect that a 
103. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 425-26 (1918) (Holmes, 
J ., dissenting). 
104. !143 U.S. at 21. See also Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965) (re-
fusal to answer not "committed in presence of court"); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 
517 (1925) (letter to judge no obstruction to trial). Cf. United States v. Combs, 390 
F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Pace, 371 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1967). 
105. See note 55 supra. 
106. !143 U.S at 10. 
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finding of contempt during the trial might have by warning the 
offenders that all future contemptuous actions would be met with 
swift judicial action. The delayed use of the summary contempt 
power in both Sacher and Dellinger, coming as it did after the con-
clusion of the trials, only served to reprimand the misconduct and 
deter similar misbehavior before other courts. It did not deter further 
misconduct during the parent proceedings. 
Fortunately, Sacher remains an anomaly disregarded in later cases, 
a decision that has evoked strong criticism from commentators.107 
Subsequent decisions108 indicate a return to the traditional view re-
quiring a need for immediate action that prevailed prior to Sacher 
and was the basis for the dissents in that decision.109 Thus, the use of 
summary contempt under Rule 42(a) came under attack in 1965 in 
Harris v. United States.110 In Harris, the defendant refused, both 
before and after being assured immunity, to answer certain questions 
before a grand jury. Finally, he was sworn before a district judge and 
again questioned. When the defendant continued his refusal to 
answer, the court issued a summary contempt citation and imposed a 
one-year jail sentence as punishment.111 In reversing the contempt 
sentence, the Supreme Court declared that summary punishment 
should be used only when necessary to achieve a speedy recovery of 
the court's dignity.112 The need for immediate action was thus re-
stored as the prerequisite to summary action: 
[S]peedy punishment may be necessary in order to achieve "summary 
107. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 86, at 255-56; Comment, supra note 51; Note, 
Effect of Delay in Summary Punishment for Criminal Contempt Under Rule 42(a), 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 795 (1952). 
108. See Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); United States v. Combs, 390 
F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Pace, 371 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1967). 
109. Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissented (343 U.S. at 14, 23, 89), their 
concern being twofold. The first concern was that 
[r]eason and fairness demand, even in punishing contempt, procedural safeguards 
within which the needs for the effective administration of justice can be amply 
satisfied while at the same time the reach of so drastic a power is kept witliin 
limits that will minimize abuse. 
343 U.S. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
The dissenters also found fault with the majority's unyielding support of a trial 
judge who "failed to exercise the moral authority of a court possessed of great tradi-
tion." 343 U.S. at 38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter assailed the 
majority's logic by noting that protection of an abuse of power diminishes, not en-
hances, the authority and tradition of the courts. 343 U.S. at 25. 
110. 382 U.S. 162 (1965). 
111. 382 U.S. at 163. 
112. 382 U.S. at 164. In so ruling the Court overruled Brown v. United States, 359 
U.S. 41 (1959), which had permitted the use of summary procedures under almost 
identical facts. Other cases in which courts invoked summary contempt when there was 
no need for immediate action were probably overruled by Harris. See, e.g., Levine v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960) (refusal to testify before grand jury); Rogers v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (refusal to answer query by grand jury); Wilson v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (refusal to respond to subpoenas duces tecum by 
grand jury). 
August 1971] Comments 1569 
vindication of the court's dignity and authority." ... But swiftness 
was not a prerequisite of justice here .... 
• . . The contempt here committed was far outside the narrow 
category envisioned by Rule 42(a) .... 
·we are concerned solely with •~procedural regularity" .... 
Rule 42(b) prescribes the "procedural regularity" for all contempts 
in the federal regime except those unusual situations envisioned by 
Rule 42(a) where instant action is necessary .... 113 
Consequently, Harris has apparently overruled sub silentio the earlier 
Sacher decision by requiring that there be an open and serious threat 
to the proceedings which only "instant action" is capable of dispel-
ling. Therefore, this requirement defines the scope of 42(a); anything 
requiring less than immediate judicial action must be disposed of in 
accordance with 42(b ). 
If instantaneous action is the test to be applied to direct contempt 
under Harris, Judge Hoffman's actions in Dellinger are unlikely to 
be upheld for, by the time of the contempt sentences, the trial had 
concluded and the need to restore order to the proceedings or to 
ensure their orderly continuation had passed.114 The fact that the 
trial had concluded suggests that Judge Hoffman found himself able 
to exert enough control during the trial, without utilizing his sum-
mary powers, to bring it to a close. If the trial judge felt no compel-
ling need to resort to summary action during the trial, it is difficult, 
in light of Harris, to imagine why it should be utilized after the trial 
had ended. Moreover, while a Rule 42(b) hearing would have delayed 
the grand jury proceedings in Harris, no delay would have ensued in 
Dellinger since the actual trial had already been completed. Thus the 
potential delay-which the Court deemed minimal in Harris115-was 
not even present in Dellinger. Harris strongly suggests that a hearing 
under Rule 42(b) was the proper procedure for the Dellinger court to 
follow. 
C. Embroilment of the Trial Judge 
Distinguishing situations appropriate for the use of the summary 
contempt power from those requiring nonsummary proceedings 
under Rule 42 is further complicated by the assumption that due 
process of law requires a judge who holds a personal interest in the 
1111. 882 U.S. at 164-67 (footnotes omitted). 
114. The situation in Dellinger may indeed resemble that described by Justice 
Frankfurter in Sacher: 
Despite the many incidents of contempt that were charged, the trial went to com-
pletion •• , without a single occasion making it necessary to lay any one of the 
lawyers by the heel in order to assure that the trial proceed. The trial judge was 
able to keep order and to continue the court's business. • • • 
343 U.S. at 86 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
115. 882 U.S. at 164. 
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outcome of a trial to disqualify himself from hearing the case.116 The 
possibility of a judicial bias affecting the outcome of a contempt pro-
ceeding is most serious when one man acts as both judge and jury, 
which, essentially, is the role of the judge when he summarily ad-
judges contempts under Rule 42(a). Cognizant of this danger, the 
Supreme Court has intensively scrutinized contempt convictions sum-
marily imposed under Rule 42(a) when the trial judge may have 
been personally embroiled in the contemptuous events.117 Thus, 
while the majority in Sacher disregarded the defendants' allegations 
that the trial judge was personally involved in the parent proceeding, 
the dissenters placed great weight on this contention.118 Citing from 
the trial record, they noted that a judge who is embroiled in the pro-
ceedings should not be permitted to sit in judgment of the con-
tempts.119 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter spoke directly to the majority's 
concern with diminishing the esteem held for the courts when he 
recognized that by permitting an embroiled judge to rule on the con-
tempts, the Court was actually rendering a disservice to the judiciary 
and tainting the very image they were seeking to uphold.120 The 
majority, however, rejected this argument, reasoning that to require 
a hearing before another judge would only serve to harass the trial 
judge since he would have to defend his actions in a separate pro-
ceeding.121 
The Court's subsequent holding in Offutt v. United States122 
vitiated the embroilment aspect of the Sacher decision. In Offutt, the 
trial court, relying on Sacher, waited until after the jury had retired 
to deliberate before summarily sentencing the defense counsel to 
ten days' imprisonment for his constant bantering and generally un-
dignified exchanges with the judge during the course of the trial.123 
Relying not on Sacher, but on the older precedent of Cooke v. United 
States,124 the Supreme Court held that a judge who becomes em-
116. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 
523 (1927). 
117. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13-15 (1954). 
118. 343 U.S. at 16-17 (Black, J., dissenting). 
119. "A judge who • , • [becomes embroiled] should no more be permitted to try 
the lawyer he accuses than a judge should be permitted to try his own case." 348 U.S. 
at 17 (Black, J., dissenting). 
120, 343 U.S. at 37 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
121, 343 U.S. at 11-12. 
122, 348 U.S. 11 (1954). 
123. 348 U.S. at 12. The Court commented that the exchanges between the attorney 
and the judge revealed "an attitude which hardly reflected the restraints of conven-
tional judicial demeanor." 348 U.S. at 12. 
124. 267 U.S. 517 (1925). The Court in Cooke held that a contemptuous letter given 
to the judge, although technically "misbehavior in the presence of the court," must 
be adjudged in a hearing before another judge since the letter had vilified the trial 
judge, thus personally involving him in the outcome of the contempt proceeding. 
267 U.S. at 539. 
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broiled in the contemptuous conduct has lost the impersonal au-
thority necessary to sit in judgment of the contemnor. 
The real issue is whether under the decision of the Cooke case such 
a ruling should have been made by the trial judge, or whether for the 
very purpose of vindicating justice for which the power of summary 
contempt is available, the determination of petitioner's guilt and the 
punishment properly to be meted out on a finding of guilt should 
have been made in the first instance by a judge not involved, as was 
this trial judge, in the petitioner's misconduct.125 
The Court went on to state that if the trial judge is involved in the 
contemnor's misbehavior another judge, perhaps the chief judge of 
the district, should determine the contemnor's guilt and punish-
ment, if any, after a hearing under Rule 42(b).126 
After the Offutt decision, in order for a defendant to request and 
receive a hearing by a separate judge under Rule 42(a), the trial judge 
must have played an active role in the defendant's misbehavior or 
become personally involved in the outcome of the case.127 The test 
established by Offutt and Cooke was whether the contemnor's be-
havior could be considered apart from the trial judge's own actions.128 
For example, in Offutt the trial judge had participated in the ex-
changes with the contemnor that served as the basis for the con-
tempt citations;129 thus, the trial judge's behavior could not be 
considered apart from that of the contemnor. However, if the trial 
judge chose to proceed only after notice and hearing under Rule 
42(b), the rule itself provided for his disqualification should the con-
tempt have "[involved] disrespect or criticism" of him.130 Thus, 
under the approach established by the Offutt and Cooke interpreta-
tion, no parity existed between 42(a) and 42(b) situations since each 
section provided a separate and distinct test for embroilment: under 
42(a) the trial judge had to be involved in the contemnor's misbe-
havior, as in Offutt, before he could be disqualified, whereas a mere 
criticism or disrespectful remark, even though it failed to elicit any 
response from the bench, automatically disqualified the judge from 
participating in a 42(b) proceeding. As a result of this disparity, it was 
easier for a contemnor to be granted a new judge for a 42(b) hearing 
125. 348 U.S. at 15. 
126. 348 U.S. at 18. The chief judge appears to be the logical choice since he is 
not exactly on the same level with the other. district judges and may not feel quite 
as restricted in ruling on contempts that involve other judges' actions. See also Cooke 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925). 
127. See, e.g., United States v. Combs, 390 F.2d 426, 429-30 (6th Cir, 1968). 
128. 348 U.S. at 13; 267 U.S. at 539. 
129, 348 U.S. at 16 n.2. 
130. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). Rule 42(a) has no such provision. See note 28 supra. 
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than for a contempt proceeding under 42(a).131 However, in a recent 
decision, the Supreme Court has made the requirements for "em-
broilment" the same under 42(a) and 42(b). The contemptuous 
behavior in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania132 consisted of various verbal 
assaults on the trial judge by the defendant, who was acting as his own 
counsel. The judge, however, restrained himself and avoided becom-
ing involved in the defendant's misbehavior. After the trial the de-
fendant was summarily sentenced to a term of eleven to twenty-two 
years imprisonment on eleven separate one- to two-year sentences.138 
The Supreme Court noted that since the trial judge had refrained 
from active participation in the defendant's contempt, the Offutt 
test134 had not been met. 
Offutt does not fit this case for the state judge in the instant con-
troversy was not an activist seeking combat. Rather, he was the target 
of petitioner's insolence. Yet a judge, vilified as was this Pennsylvania 
judge, necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter contro-
versy. No one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm 
detachment necessary for fair adjudication.135 
Thus, under Mayberry, vilification of the trial judge is all that is 
necessary under Rule 42(a) to require a contempt hearing before a 
different judge. 
Unfortunately, many of the specific contempts in Dellinger do 
not fall within the Mayberry rule of "vilification." While several of 
the contempt specifications involved direct assaults on the judiciary, 
and Judge Hoffman in particular, many were based on outbreaks 
unrelated to the judge.136 However, at least with regard to those 
131. Not every criticism of the judge is sufficient to support a new hearing by a 
separate judge. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 578, 583-84 (1964) (a prosecution wit• 
ness' criticism of the trial judge's rules did not necessarily mean that the judge was 
embroiled). But cf. United States v. Combs, 390 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968), in which 
contemnor was charged with contempt for (1) alleging bias by the judge and (2) 
recording proceedings in the courtroom with neither the knowledge nor consent of 
the trial judge. While the trial judge agreed to allow another judge to hear the first 
charge, he retained jurisdiction over the second. The court of appeals reversed, holding 
that both should be tried by a new judge since the trial judge's "feelings" were in-
volved in the second charge and there was no need for immediate action. 390 F .2d 
at 431. 
132. 400 U.S. 455 (1971). 
133. 400 U.S. at 455. 
134. See text accompanying note 125 supra. 
135. 400 U.S. at 465. 
136. Thus, at least thirty-one of the specifications involved the defendants' refusals 
to rise when the judge entered the courtroom and other indignities paid the court. 
Specifically, 
[O]n February 6th, the defendant[s] Hoffman [and Rubin] attempted to hold the 
Court up to ridicule by entering the courtroom in judicial robes •••• 
While the transcript does not reflect it, [they] remained in those robes for a 
considerable period of time before the jury. Later, [they] removed the robes, threw 
them on the floor of the courtroom, and wiped [their] feet on them. 
Specifications No. 13 (Rubin) and 24 (Hoffman). CoNTEMPT, supra note 58, at 127, 
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specifications that were based on remarks exhibiting disrespect for 
the authority of the trial judge, Judge Hoffman should have been 
precluded from personally deciding the contempt question. I£ im-
partiality in the contempt proceeding is the goal, it is doubtful that 
it could have been achieved under the circumstances of Dellinger. 
Moreover, the trial court exhibited personal disdain for the de-
fendants and their counsel. The court's attitude was best character-
ized by its address to attorney Kunstler before the latter was sentenced 
for contempt: 
I am going to make a rather unorthodox statement. First of all, there 
is a lot of crime .... I am one of those who believe that crime, if 
it is on the increase, ... is due in large part to the fact that waiting 
in the wings are lawyers who are willing to go beyond ... professional 
duty in their defense of a defendant, and the fact that ... some de-
fendants know that such a lawyer is waiting in the wings, I think, 
has a rather stimulating effect on the increase in crime.187 
There remain some discernible factors that could lead to an ap-
pellate court affirmation of Judge Hoffman's actions. First, as the 
Supreme Court noted in Jl.foyberry, "it is of course not every attack 
on a judge that disqualifies him,"138 and it is at least questionable 
whether all the attacks on Judge Hoffman were of the vindictive 
quality envisioned by the Court in Mayberry. Second, an appellate 
court may hesitate to overrule Judge Hoffman for fear that to do so 
will reduce the courts' summary contempt powers and result in a loss 
of respect for judicial authority. However, limitations on the arbi-
trary use of the contempt power do not affect the over-all disciplinary 
impact of the threat of a finding of contempt on those who enter the 
courtroom. The only difference would be that an adjudication of, and 
punishment for, contempt during a trial would be determined by 
<1!1other judge. Finally, any deleterious effect that delay may have on 
the parent proceedings139 could be minimized if the contemnors are 
cited immediately, leaving only the actual adjudication and punish-
ment to await the close of the trial. 
The entire tenor of the Dellinger trial, with its constant exchanges 
139. Many of the remaining 124 specifications do not clearly involve any vilification 
of Judge Hoffman. Some of the contemnors' comments were leveled directly against 
the prosecutor. For example, Dellinger was cited for his reaction to a prosecu-
tion statement concerning Senators Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy. Specifica-
tion No. 27 (Dellinger). Id. at 63-64. 
137. Id. at 207. 
138. 400 U.S. at 465. 
139. See, e.g., Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961); 
Madnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951); Hallinan v. United States, 182 
F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950). 
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between the defendants and the judge,140 was such that to allow Judge 
Hoffman to adjudicate at least those contempts leveled directly 
against him would destroy even the appearance of justice. The de-
fendants exhibited a clear showing of disrespect for Judge Hoffman, 
and the disparity in Judge Hoffman's treatment of the defense and 
prosecution exemplified his personal involvement in the trial. The 
resulting animosity between the defendants and the judge was suffi-
cient, under both Mayberry and Offutt, to require at least a separate 
contempt hearing before a different district judge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 161 contempt citations issued in Dellinger present issues of 
constitutional and statutory importance-all of which seem to re-
quire that the contempt convictions be reversed. Although the ques-
tion of the appropriateness of a jury trial in the criminal contempt 
setting has been raised on past occasions,141 the Supreme Court has 
never addressed itself to the question of exactly how the six-month 
standard relates to multiple contempt sentences.142 There are argu-
ments supporting the application of the six-month rule to either each 
individual contempt citation or to the aggregate sentence. It is clear, 
however, that if the rule is applied only to individual charges a judge 
can circumvent the jury trial requirement by simply imposing sen-
tences of less than six months duration and running several contempt 
sentences consecutively. The potential for harshness and misuse 
inherent in such an interpretation is perhaps the strongest argument 
for applying the six-month rule to the aggregate contempt sentence. 
Only in this way can the substance of the constitutional right to jury 
trial be preserved. Judge Hoffman's decision to utilize summary pro-
ceedings under Rule 42(a) instead of conducting a separate hearing 
under 42(b) raises what is perhaps a more subtle issue. However, the 
Supreme Court has recently addressed itself to this problem and h 1s 
resolved it by stating unequivocally that "Rule 42(b) prescribes the 
procedural regularity . . . except [in] those unusual situations en-
visioned by Rule 42(a) where instant action is necessary."148 Thus, 
the procedures under Rule 42(b) should have been followed since 
immediacy, the linchpin of summary action, was lacking in Dellinger. 
Another recent Supreme Court decision, Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,w, 
suggests that the contempt citations in Dellinger would have been 
140. See TALES, supra note 55, at 16-237. 
141. See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text. 
142. While Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966), held that a sentence 
of six months or less would not necessitate a jury trial, some dicta in Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970), hinted that the six-month line may not be definitive. 
143. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965). 
144. 400 U.S. 455 (1971). 
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more appropriately handled by another judge145 and that reversal is 
required because of Judge Hoffman's "embroilment" in the con-
temptuous events. 
Perhaps even more basic than the statutory and constitutional 
issues raised by Dellinger is the question of the appropriateness of 
criminal contempt as a sanction at all. In the 1970 case of Illinois v. 
Allen,146 the Supreme Court condoned three alternative methods of 
dealing with unruly defendants. Under Allen such a defendant may 
be cited for contempt, bound and gagged, or removed from the court-
room entirely with the understanding that return is contingent upon 
future good behavior.147 The Court noted that physical restraint 
within the courtroom should be the last alternative chosen by a judge 
since it arouses negative feelings in the jury and defies the very 
dignity that the court is attempting to uphold.148 Beyond that 
suggestion, the Court in Allen held no apparent preference for any of 
the possible sanctions. An immediate sanction, similar to that used in 
Allen, may well have been a more appropriate remedy than contempt 
for dealing with the defendants' disruptions during the course of the 
Dellinger trial. At least such action may have had some deterrent 
effect on the contemnors' future behavior, whereas summary action 
after the trial had no deterrent value whatsoever. The choice of 
sanctions-so long as of the type approved in Allen-appears to be 
wholly within the discretion of the trial judge. Once, however, that 
choice has been made it is incumbent upon the trial judge to abide 
by the various procedures established by the Supreme Court-and, of 
course, those set out in the Constitution itself. 
145. See notes l!l2-ll7 supra and accompanying text. 
146. !197 U.S. !137 (1970). The defendant, on trial for armed robbery, interrupted 
the proceedings initially at voir dire by screaming and shouting. After several more 
outbreaks the judge had him removed from the courtroom and conditioned his return 
upon a promise of good behavior. Approximately halfway through the trial Allen was 
allowed to return for the remainder of his trial. 397 U.S. at 339-41. 
147. 397 U.S. at 343-44. 
148. 397 U.S. at 344. 
